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Abstract. We develop a model of matching with contracts which has, as special 
cases, the college admissions problem, the Kelso-Crawford labor market 
matching model, and ascending package auctions. We introduce a new “law of 
aggregate demand” for the case of discrete heterogeneous workers and show 
that, when workers are substitutes, the law is satisfied by the demands of profit 
maximizing firms. When workers are substitutes and the law is satisfied, truthful 
reporting is a dominant strategy for workers in a worker-offering 
auction/matching algorithm. We also parameterize a large class of preferences 
satisfying the two conditions.  
I. Introduction 
Since the pioneering US spectrum auctions of 1994 and 1995, related ascending 
multi-item auctions have been used with much fanfare on six continents for sales of radio 
spectrum and electricity supply contracts (Milgrom (2004)).
2 Package bidding, in which 
bidders can place bids not just for individual lots but also for bundles of lots 
(“packages”), has found increasing use in procurement applications; recent proposals in 
the US to allow package bidding for spectrum licenses incorporate ideas suggested by 
Ausubel and Milgrom (2002) and by Porter, Rassenti, Roopnarine and Smith (2003).  
Matching algorithms based on economic theory are also influencing practice. Roth 
and Peranson (1999) explain how a certain two-sided matching procedure, which is 
similar to the college admissions algorithm introduced by Gale and Shapley (1962), has 
been adapted to match 20,000 doctors per year to medical residency programs. 
Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (2003) advocate a variation of the same algorithm for use by 
school choice programs.  
This paper identifies and explores certain similarities among all of these auction and 
matching mechanisms. To illustrate one similarity, consider the labor market auction 
model of Kelso and Crawford (1982), in which firms bid for workers in simultaneous 
ascending auctions. The Kelso-Crawford model assumes that workers have preferences 
over firm-wage pairs and that all wage offers are drawn from pre-specified finite set. If 
that set includes only one wage, then all that is left for the auction to determine is the 
match of workers to firms, so the auction is effectively transformed into a matching 
algorithm. The auction algorithm begins with each firm proposing employment to its 
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most preferred set of workers at the one possible wage. When some workers turn it down, 
the firm makes offers to other workers to fill its remaining openings. This procedure is 
precisely the hospital-offering version of the Gale-Shapley matching algorithm. Hence, 
the Gale-Shapley matching algorithm is a special case of the Kelso-Crawford procedure.  
The possibility of extending the National Resident Matching Program (the “Match”) 
in a practical way to permit wage competition is an important element in assessing public 
policy toward the Match, particularly because there is some theoretical support for the 
position that the Match may compress and reduce doctors’ wages relative to a perfectly 
competitive standard (Bulow and Levin (2003)). The practical possibility of such an 
extension depends on many details, including importantly the form in which doctors and 
hospitals would have to report their preferences for use in the Match. For example, it 
would be desirable for the hospitals in an extended Match to be able to report preferences 
that encompass affirmative action constraints and the relationship between subspecialties 
as easily they can in the current algorithm. We address some of these preference 
encoding issues later in this paper.  
A second important similarity is between the Gale-Shapley doctor-offering algorithm 
and the Ausubel-Milgrom proxy auction. Explaining this relationship requires restating 
the algorithm in a different form from the one used for the preceding comparison. We 
show that if the hospitals in the Match consider doctors to be substitutes, then the doctor-
offering algorithm is equivalent to a certain cumulative offer process in which the 
hospitals at each round can choose from all the offers they have received at any round, 
current or past. In a different environment, where there is but a single “hospital” or 
auctioneer but the doctors’ contracts need not be substitutes and can contain general 
terms, a formally identical cumulative offer process coincides exactly with the Ausubel-
Milgrom proxy auction.  
Despite the close connections among these mechanisms, previous analyses have 
treated them quite separately. In particular, analyses of auctions typically assume that 
bidders’ payoffs are quasi-linear. No corresponding assumption is made in analyzing the 
medical match or the college admissions problem; indeed, the very possibility of 
monetary transfers is excluded from those formulations. As discussed below, the quasi-
linearity assumption combines with the substitutes assumption of matching theory in a 
subtle and restrictive way.   
This paper presents a new model that subsumes, unifies and extends the models cited 
above. The basic unit of analysis in our formulation is the contract. To reproduce the 
Gale-Shapley college admissions problem, we specify that a contract identifies only the 
student and college; all other terms of the relationship are exogenous. To reproduce the 
Kelso-Crawford model of firms bidding for workers, we specify that a contract identifies 
the firm, the worker, and the wage. Finally, to reproduce the Ausubel-Milgrom model of 
package bidding, we specify that a contract identifies the bidder, the package of items 
that the bidder will acquire, and the price to be paid for that package. Many additional 
variations can be encompassed by the model. For example, a contract might specify the 
particular responsibilities that a worker will have within the firm.  
Our analysis of the Gale-Shapley and Kelso-Crawford models and their extensions 
emphasizes two conditions that restrict the preferences of the firms/hospitals/colleges: a   3
substitutes condition and an law of aggregate demand condition. We find that these two 
conditions are implied by the assumptions of earlier analyses, so our unified treatment 
implies the central results of those theories as special cases.  
In the tradition of demand theory, we define substitutes by a comparative statics 
condition. In demand theory, the exogenous parameter change is a price decrease, so the 
challenge is to extend the definition to models in which there may be no price that is 
allowed to change. In our contracts model, a price reduction corresponds formally to 
expanding the firm’s opportunity set, that is, to making the set of feasible contracts 
larger. Our substitutes condition asserts that when the firm chooses from an expanded set 
of contracts, the set of contracts it rejects also expands (weakly). As we will show, this 
abstract substitutes condition coincides exactly with the price theory condition for 
standard models with prices. It also coincides exactly with the Roth and Sotomayor 
(1990) “substitutable preferences” condition for the college admissions problem, in 
which there are no prices.  
The law of aggregate demand is similarly defined by a comparative static. It is the 
condition that when a college or firm chooses from an expanded set, it admits at least as 
many students or hire at least as many workers.
3  
The term “law of aggregate demand” is motivated by the relation of this condition to 
the law of demand in producer theory. According to producer theory, a profit-maximizing 
firm demands (weakly) more of any input as its price falls. For the matching model with 
prices, the law of aggregate demand requires that when any input price falls, the 
aggregate quantity demanded, which includes the quantities demanded of that input and 
all of its substitutes, rises (weakly). Notice that it is tricky even to state such a law in 
producer theory with divisible inputs, because there is no general aggregate quantity 
measure when divisible inputs are diverse. In the present model with indivisible workers, 
we measure the aggregate quantity of workers demanded or hired by the total number of 
such workers.  
A key step in our analysis is to prove a new result in demand theory: if workers are 
substitutes, then a profit maximizing firm’s employment choices satisfy the law of 
aggregate demand. Since firms are profit maximizers and regard workers as substitutes in 
the Kelso-Crawford model, it follows that the law of aggregate demand holds for that 
model. Thus, one implication of the standard quasi-linearity assumption of auction theory 
is that the bidders’ preferences satisfy the law of aggregate demand. We find that 
“responsive preferences,” which are commonly assumed in matching theory analyses, 
also satisfy the law of aggregate demand. We then prove some new results for the class of 
auction and matching models that satisfy this law.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the matching-with-contracts 
notation and characterizes the stable sets of contracts or core allocations in terms of the 
solution of a certain system of two equations.  
Section III introduces the substitutes condition and uses it to prove that the set of core 
allocations is a non-empty lattice, and that a certain generalization of the Gale-Shapley 
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algorithm identifies its maximum and minimum elements. These two extreme points are 
characterized as a doctor-optimal/hospital-pessimal point, which is a point that is the best 
in the core for every doctor and that is worst in the core for every hospital, and a hospital-
optimal/doctor-pessimal point with the reverse attributes.  
Section III also proves several related results. First, if there are at least two hospitals 
and if some hospital has preferences that are not substitutes, then even if all other 
hospitals have just a single opening, there exists a profile of preferences for the students 
and colleges such that no core allocation exists. This result is important for the 
construction of matching algorithms. It means that no matching procedure which permits 
students and colleges to report preferences that are not substitutes can be guaranteed 
always to select a core allocation with respect to the reported preferences.  
Another result concerns vacancy chain dynamics, which traces the dynamic 
adjustment of the labor market when a worker retires or a new worker enters the market 
and the dynamics are represented by the operator we have described. The analysis 
extends that of Blum, Roth and Rothblum (1997) but with a larger class of preferences in 
which firms do not have an exogenously fixed number of vacancies and the number of 
positions that are filled can change during the adjustment process. We find that, starting 
from a core allocation, the vacancy adjustment process converges to a new core 
allocation.  
Section IV introduces the law of aggregate demand, verifies that it holds for a profit-
maximizing firm when inputs are substitutes, and explores its consequences. When both 
the substitutes and the law of aggregate demand condition are satisfied, then (1) the set of 
workers employed and the set of jobs filled is the same at every stable collection of 
contracts and (2) it is a dominant strategy for doctors (or workers or students) to report 
their preferences truthfully in the doctor-offering version of the extended Gale-Shapley 
algorithm. We also demonstrate the necessity of a weaker version of the law of aggregate 
demand for these conclusions.  
Our conclusion about this dominant strategy property substantially extends earlier 
findings about incentives in matching. The first such results, due to Dubins and Freedman 
(1981) and Roth (1982), established the dominant strategy property for the marriage 
problem, which is a one-to-one matching problem that is a special case of the college 
admissions problem. Similarly, Demange and Gale (1985) establish the dominant strategy 
property for the worker-firm matching problem in which each firm has singleton 
preferences. These results generalize to the case of responsive preferences, that is, to the 
case where each hospital (or college or firm) behaves just the same as a collection of 
smaller hospitals with one opening each. For the college admissions problem, 
Abdulkadiroğlu (2003) has shown that the dominant strategy property also holds when 
colleges have responsive preferences with capacity constraints, where the constraints 
limit the number of workers of a particular type that can be hired. All of these models 
with a dominant strategy property satisfy our substitutes and law of aggregate demand 
conditions, so the earlier dominant strategy results are all subsumed by our new result.  
In section V, we address the practicality of the generalized algorithm by asking how 
the hospitals might express their complex preferences in a neatly parameterized way. We 
introduce the extended assignment preferences and show that they subsume certain   5
previously identified classes and satisfy both the substitutes condition and the law of 
aggregate demand.  
Section VI introduces cumulative offer processes as an alternative auction/matching 
algorithm and shows that when contracts are substitutes, it coincides with the doctor-
offering algorithm of the previous sections. Since the Ausubel-Milgrom proxy auction is 
also a cumulative offer process, our dominant strategy conclusion of section IV implies 
an extension of the Ausubel-Milgrom dominant strategy result. For the case when 
contracts are not substitutes, the cumulative offer process can converge to an allocation 
that is not stable. We show that if there is a single hospital/auctioneer, however, the 
cumulative offer process converges to a core allocation, even when goods are not 
substitutes.  
Section VII concludes. 
II. Stable Collections of Contracts 
The matching model without transfers has many applications, of which the best 
known among economists is the match of doctors to hospital residency programs in the 
United States. For the remainder of the paper, we adopt the terminology of doctors and 
hospitals, which plays the same respective roles as students and colleges in the college 
admissions problem and similar roles to those of workers and firms in the Kelso-
Crawford labor market model.  
Notation 
The sets of doctors and hospitals are denoted by D and H, respectively, and the set of 
contracts is denoted by X. We assume only that each contract x X ∈  is bilateral, so that it 
is associated with one “doctor”  D x D ∈  and one “hospital”  H x H ∈ . When all terms of 
employment are fixed and exogenous, the set of contracts is just the set of doctor-hospital 
pairs:  X DH ≡×. For the Kelso-Crawford model, a contract specifies a firm, a worker 
and a wage,  X DHW ≡××.  
Each doctor d can sign only one contract. Her preferences over possible contracts, 
including the null contract ∅, are described by the total order  d   . The null contract 
represents unemployment, and contracts are acceptable or unacceptable according to 
whether they are more preferred than ∅. When we write preferences as  : dd d Px y z   , 
we mean that  d P  names the preference order of d and that the listed contracts (in this 
case, x, y and z) are the only acceptable ones.  
Given a set of contracts  X X ′⊂  offered in the market, doctor d’s chosen set () d CX ′  
is either the null set, if no acceptable contracts are offered, or the singleton set consisting 
of the most preferred contract. We formalize this as follows:  
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The choices of a hospital h are more complicated, because it has preferences  h    over 
sets of doctors. Its chosen set is a subset of the contracts that name it, that is, 
(){ | } hH CX x Xx h ′′ ⊂∈ =. In addition, we do not allow a hospital to choose to sign two 
contracts with the same doctor.  
  () ( ) ( ) ,( ) dD D dD X X x xC Xxx x x ′′ ′ ′ ′ ∀∈ ∀ ⊂ ∀ ∈ ≠ ⇒ ≠ .   (2) 
L e t  () () Dd D d CX CX ∈ ′′ = ∪  denote the set of contracts chosen by some doctor from set 
X′. Offers in X′that are not chosen are in the rejected set:  () () DD R XX C X ′ ′′ = − . 
Similarly, the hospitals’ chosen and rejected sets are denoted by  ( ) ( ) Hh H h CX C X ∈ ′′ = ∪  
a n d  () () HH R XX C X ′′ ′ =− .  
Core Allocations: Stable Sets of Contracts 
In our model, an allocation is a collection of contracts, since that determines the 
payoffs to each participant. There is a subtlety in defining the core for matching models 
that centers on the definition of when a coalition can block a proposed allocation. The 
resolution most consistent with the previous literature is to focus on the case where a 
coalition can block a proposed allocation if there is another allocation that the coalition 
members can implement by itself that all coalition members weakly prefer and that some 
coalition members strictly prefer. In the usual way for matching models, if any coalition 
involving multiple hospitals can block an allocation, then there is a subcoalition 
consisting of a single hospital and its doctors that can also block, since they can make the 
beneficial deviation on their own. With that observation in mind, let us say that a set of 
contracts  X X ′⊂  is blocked if it includes some unacceptable contract or if there exists 
some hospital h and some  X X ′′ ⊂  such that  X X ′′′ ⊄ , ( ) h X CX X ′′′ ′ ′ = ∪  and 
() D X CX X ′′ ′ ′′ ⊂∪ . A core allocation or stable set of contracts is a set of contracts  X′ 
that is unblocked by any coalition.  
Our first result characterizes the stable sets of contracts in terms of the solution of a 
system of two equations.  
Theorem 1. If 
2 (,) DH X XX ⊂  satisfies the system of equations 
 () D HH X XRX =−  and  ( ) H DD X XRX = − , (3) 
then ( ) ( ) D DH H HD CX CX X X == ∩  is a stable set of contracts. Conversely, for any 
stable collection of contracts  X′, there exists some pair ( , ) D H X X  satisfying (3) such 
that  H D X XX ′ =∩.  
Proof. Since  ( ) D DD CX X ⊂  and  ( ) D HH CX X ⊂ , ( ) ( ) D DH H H D CX CX X X ∩ ⊂∩. 
For the reverse inclusion, suppose  H D x XX ∈ ∩ . Then, (3) implies  ( ) D D x RX ∉  and 
() H H x RX ∉ . Hence,  ( ) ( ) D DH H x CX CX ∈∩. Since x is arbitrary, 
() () H DD D H H X XC X C X ∩⊂ ∩ . It follows that  ( ) ( ) H DH H D D X XC X C X ∩ =∩ .   7
Next, we prove that  ( ) ( ) H HD D CX CX = . Suppose to the contrary that there exists 
some ( ) ( ) D DH H x CX CX ∈−. Since  ( ) D D x CX ∈ , ( ) D D x RX ∉ . Then, 
() D DH x XRX X ∈− = . Therefore, since  ( ) H H x CX ∉ , it follows that  ( ) H H x RX ∈  and 
hence ( ) H HD x XRX X ∉− = , so  ( ) D D x CX ∉ . This contradiction implies that 
() () DD HH CX CX −= ∅ . A symmetric argument implies that  ( ) ( ) HH DD CX CX −= ∅ , so 
() () H HD D CX CX = .  
Hence, ( ) ( ) D DH H HD CX CX X X == ∩ . 
To show that  ˆ () () H DH H D D X XX C XC X ≡∩= =  is a stable set of contracts, suppose 
to the contrary that it is blocked. Every contract in  ( ) D D CX is acceptable, so there must 
exist some hospital h and some  X X ′⊂  such that 
(i)  ˆˆ () ( ) ( ) hh h h H X CX X CX CX ′′ =∪ =    and (ii) there is no doctor d such that 
() dDd d CX X ′   . (That is, the hospital can propose a collection of contracts  X′ that the 
hospital strictly prefers and the its partner doctors all weakly prefer, compared to the 
allocation  ˆ X .) In view of (i),  ( ) H DD X XX R X ′⊄ =− , so there is some 
() D D x XR X ′ ∈∩ , contrary to (ii).  
For the second statement of the theorem, suppose that  X′ is a stable collection of 
contracts. Since the doctors’ choice sets are singletons, we may define  H X  to be the set 
of contracts that some doctor in D weakly prefers to her contract in  X′. By construction, 
H X X ′⊂ . Since  X′ is stable,  ( ) HH CX X ′ = . Let  ( ) D H X XX X ′ = ∪− . By construction,  
() DD CX X ′ = . Hence, ( , ) D H X X  satisfies (3).  ■ 
Theorem 1 is formulated to apply to general sets of contracts. It is the basis of our 
analysis of stable sets of contracts in the entire set of models treated in this paper.  
III. Substitutes 
In this section, we introduce our first restriction on hospital preferences, which is the 
restriction that contracts are substitutes. We use the restriction to prove the existence of a 
stable set of contracts and to study an algorithm that identifies those contracts.  
Our substitutes condition generalizes the Roth-Sotomayor substitutable preferences 
condition to preferences over contracts. In words, the substitutable preferences condition 
states that if a doctor is not chosen by a hospital from some set of available doctors, then 
that doctor will still not be chosen if the set of available doctors is larger. Our substitutes 
condition is similarly defined as follows:  
Definition. Elements of X are substitutes for hospital h if for all subsets  
X XX ′′ ′ ⊂⊂  we have  ( ) ( ) hh R XR X ′′ ′ ⊂ .  
In the language of lattice theory, which we use below, elements of X are substitutes 
for hospital h exactly when the function  h R  is isotone.    8
In demand theory, substitutes is defined by a comparative static that uses prices. It 
says that, limiting attention to the domain of wage vectors at which there is a unique 
optimum for the hospital, the hospital’s demand for any doctor d is non-decreasing in the 
wage of each other doctor d′.  
Our next result verifies that for resource allocation problems involving prices, our 
definition of substitutes coincides with the standard demand theory definition. For 
simplicity, we focus on a single hospital and suppress its identifier h from our notation. 
Thus, imagine that a hospital chooses doctors’ contracts from a subset of  X DW =×, 
where D is a finite set of doctors and  { ,..., } Www =  is a finite set of possible wages. 
Assume that the set of wages W is such that the hospitals’ preferences are always strict. 
Suppose that  max wW =  is a prohibitively high wage, so that no hospital ever hires a 
doctor at wage w.  
In demand theory, it is standard to represent the hospital’s market opportunities by a 
vector 
D wW ∈  that specifies a wage  d w  at which each doctor can be hired. We can 
extend the domain of the choice function C to allow market opportunities to be expressed 
by wage vectors, as follows: 
  ( ) { } ( ) (, ) |
D
d wW C w C d w d D ∈⇒ ≡ ∈ (4) 
Formula (4) associates with any wage vector w the set of contracts {( , )| } d dw d D ∈  and 
defines  () Cw to be the choice from that set. 
With the choice function extended this way, we can now describe the traditional 
demand theory substitutes condition. The condition asserts that increasing the wage of 
doctor d from  d w  to  d w′  cannot reduce demand for any other doctor d′.  
Definition. C satisfies the demand-theory substitutes condition if (i) dd ′ ≠ , 
(ii) ( , ) ( ) d dw C w ′ ′ ∈  and (iii)  dd ww ′ >  imply that  ( ) (, ) , dd d dw Cww ′ − ′′ ∈ . 
To compare the two conditions, we need to be able to assign a vector of wages to 
each set of contracts  X′. It is possible that, in  X′, some doctor is unavailable at any 
wage or is available at several different wages. For a profit-maximizing hospital, the 
doctor’s relevant wage is the lowest wage, if any, at which she is available. Moreover, 
such a hospital does not distinguish between a doctor who is unavailable and one who is 
available only at a prohibitively high wage. Thus, from the perspective of a profit-
maximizing hospital, having contracts  X′ available is equivalent to facing a wage vector 
ˆ() WX ′  specified as follows:  
  ˆ ()m i n { |  o r  ( , ) } d WX s s w d s X ′′ == ∈ . (5) 
In view of the preceding discussion, a profit-maximizing hospital’s choices must obey 
the following identity:  
(A1)  ˆ () (() ) CX CWX ′ ′ = . (6)   9
Theorem 2. Suppose that  X DW =× is a finite set of doctor-wage pairs and that (A1) 
holds. Then C satisfies the demand theory substitutes condition if and only if it contracts 
are substitutes.  
Proof. Let ij ≠ , () ( ) , j j wC w ∈  and  ii ww ′ > . Define  () ( ) { } ,| jjj Z wj w w w ≡≥    . 
Then,  ( ) () , ii Z ww Zw − ′ ⊂ . If contracts are substitutes, then  ( ) ( ) () () , ii R Zww RZw − ′ ⊂ . 
By (A1), since () () , j jw Cw ∈ , it follows that ( ) ( ) ( ) , j jw CZ w ∈ , so 
() () () , j j wR Z w ∉ . Hence, () ( ) ( ) ,, ji i jw RZ w w − ′ ∉ . So,  
() ()() () ( ) ( ) ,, , , ji i i i i i j w Zww RZww CZww −− − ′′ ′ ∈− =  and thus ( ) () ,, ji i j wC w w − ′ ∈  by 
assumption (A1). Thus, C satisfies demand theory substitutes.  
Conversely, suppose contracts are not substitutes. Then, there exists a set  X′, an 
element () , i iw X ′ ∉ , and () ,( ) j j wR X ′ ∈  such that ( ) ( ) , j j wR X ′′ ∉ , where 
() { } , i X Xi w ′′ ′ =∪ . Using (A1),  ˆ () ii wW X ′ < . Let  ˆ () wW X ′′′ ′ =  and  ˆ () ii wW X ′′ = . Then, 
ii ww ′′ ′ >  and () () , j jw Cw ′′ ∈ , but ( ) ( ) ,, ji i jw Cw w − ′′′ ∉ , so C does not satisfy the demand 
theory substitutes condition.  ■ 
In particular, this shows that the Kelso-Crawford “gross substitutes” condition is 
subsumed by our substitutes condition. 
1. Substitutes and Stable Matches 
We now introduce a monotonic algorithm that will be shown to coincide with the 
Gale-Shapley algorithm on its original domain. To describe the monotonicity that is 
found in the algorithm, let us define an order on  X X ×  as follows:  
  () () () ( ) , ,  and  D HD H D DH H X XX X X XX X ′ ′′ ′ ≥⇔ ⊃ ⊂ . (7) 
With this definition, ( , ) XX ×≥  is a finite lattice.  
The algorithm is defined as the iterated applications of a certain function 
: F XX XX ×→×, as defined below.  
 
( ) ( )
() ()
() ( ) ( ) () ()
1
2
12 1 ,,
H
D
DH H H
FX X R X
FX XR X
FX X FX FFX
′′ =−
′′ =−
=
   (8) 
As we have previously observed, since the doctors’ choices are singletons, a revealed 
preference argument establishes that the function  : D R XX →  is isotone. If the contracts 
are substitutes for the hospitals, then the function  : H R XX →  is isotone as well. When   10
both are isotone, the function  ( ) ( ) :, , FXX XX × ≥→ × ≥ is also isotone, that is, it 
satisfies  () () () () ( ) ( ) ,, , , DH DH DH D H XX XX F XX F X X ′ ′ ′′ ≥⇒ ≥ .  
Thus,  : FX X X X ×→× is an isotone function from a finite lattice into itself. Using 
fixed point theory for finite lattices, the set of fixed points is a non-empty lattice and 
iterated applications of F, starting from the minimum and maximum points of  X X × , 
converge monotonically to a fixed point of F.
4 We summarize the particular application 
here with the following theorem.  
Theorem 3. Suppose contracts are substitutes for the hospitals. Then,  
1.  the set of fixed points of F on  X X ×  is a non-empty finite lattice, and in 
particular includes a smallest element (,) D H X X  and a largest element 
(,) D H X X , 
2.  starting at () ( ) ,, DH XX X = ∅ , the algorithm converges monotonically to the 
highest fixed point  ( ) ( )( ) { } (,) s u p , | , , DH XX X X F X X X X ′ ′′ ′ ′′ ′ ′′ =≥ , and 
3.  starting at () ( ) ,, DH X XX =∅ , the algorithm converges monotonically to the 
lowest fixed point  ( ) ( ) ( ) { } (,) i n f , | , , DH XX X X F X X X X ′ ′′ ′ ′′ ′ ′′ =≤ .  
The facts that (,) D H X X  is the highest fixed point of F and that (,) D H X X  is the 
lowest in the specified order mean that for any other fixed point ( , ) D H X X , 
D DD X XX ⊂⊂ and  H HH X XX ⊂⊂. Because doctors are better off when they can 
choose from a larger set of contracts, it follows that the doctors unanimously weakly 
prefer  () D D CX to  ( ) D D CX to  () D D CX and similarly that the hospitals unanimously 
prefer  () H H CX to  ( ) H H CX to  () H H CX. Notice, by theorem 1, that 
() () D DH H D H CX CX X X == ∩  and  () () D DH H D H CX CX X X = =∩, so we have the 
following welfare conclusion.  
Theorem 4.  Suppose contracts are substitutes for the hospitals. Then, the stable set of 
contracts  D H X X ∩  is the unanimously most preferred stable set for the doctors and the 
unanimously least preferred stable set for the hospitals. Similarly, the stable set 
D H X X ∩  is the unanimously most preferred stable set for the hospitals and the 
unanimously least preferred stable set for the doctors. 
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with maximum point  z . Let  0 zz = ,  10 () zF z = , …  1 () nn zF z − = . Plainly,  10 zz ≤  and since F is isotone, 
21 0 1 () () zF z F z z =≤=  and similarly  1 nn zz + ≤  for all n. So, the decreasing sequence {} n z  converges in a 
finite number of steps to a point  ˆ z  with  ˆˆ () F zz = . Moreover, for any fixed point  z   , since  zz ≤   , 
ˆ () ()
nn zFz Fz z =≤=     for n large, so  ˆ z  is the maximum fixed point. A similar argument applies for the 
minimum fixed point.    11
Theorems 3 and 4 duplicate and extend familiar conclusions about stable matches in 
the Gale-Shapley matching problem and a similar conclusion about equilibrium prices in 
the Kelso-Crawford labor market model. These new theorems encompass both these 
older models, and additional ones with general contract terms.  
To see how the Gale-Shapley algorithm is encompassed, consider the doctor-offering 
algorithm. As in the original formulation, we suppose that hospitals have a ranking of 
doctors that is independent of the other doctors they will hire, so hospital h just chooses 
its  h n  most preferred doctors (from among those who are acceptable and have proposed 
to it).  
Let us interpret  ( ) H X t to be the cumulative set of contracts offered by the doctors to 
the hospitals through iteration t, and let us interpret  ( ) D X t  to be the set of contracts that 
have not yet been rejected by the hospitals through iteration t. Then, the contracts “held” 
at the end of the iteration are precisely those that have been offered but not rejected, 
which are those in  ( ) ( ) DH X tX t ∩ . The process initiates with no offers having been made 
or rejected so,  (0) D X X =  and  (0) H X = ∅. 
Iterated applications of the operator F described above define a monotonic process, in 
which the set of doctors make an ever-larger (accumulated) set of offers and the set of 
unrejected offers grows smaller round by round. Using the specification of F and starting 
from the extreme point ( , ), X ∅  we have: 
  ( )
()
() ( 1 )
() ()
DH H
HD D
Xt XRXt
Xt XRXt
= −−
=−
 (9) 
After offers have been made in iteration  1 t − , the hospital’s cumulative set of offers 
is ( 1) H Xt − . Each hospital h hold onto the  h n  best offers it has received at any iteration 
provided that many acceptable offers have been made; otherwise it holds all acceptable 
offers that have been made. Thus, the accumulated set of rejected offers is  () (1 ) HH RXt −  
and the unrejected offers are those in  ( ) (1 ) ( ) HH D X RXt Xt −− = . At round t, if a 
doctor’s is being held, then the last offer the doctor made was its best contract in  ( ) D X t . 
If a doctor’s last offer was rejected, then its new offer is its best contract in  ( ) D X t . The 
contracts that doctors have not offered at this round or any earlier one are therefore those 
in  () () DD R Xt. So, the accumulated set of offers doctors have made are those in 
() () () DD H X RXt Xt −= .  
According to this analysis, when ( ) D X t  and  ( ) H X t  are interpreted as suggested 
above, the process { ( ), ( )} DH X tX t described by (9) and the initial conditions  (0) D X X =  
and (0) H X =∅ coincides with characterizes the doctor-offering Gale-Shapley algorithm. 
For the hospital offering algorithm, a similar analysis applies but with a different 
interpretation of the sets and a different initial condition. We interpret  ( ) D X t to be the 
cumulative set of contracts offered by the hospitals to the doctors before iteration t and   12
() H X t  to be the set of contracts that have not yet been rejected by the hospitals up to and 
including iteration t. Then, the contracts “held” at the end of iteration t are precisely those 
that have been offered but not rejected, which are those in  ( 1) ( ) DH X tX t + ∩ . With this 
interpretation, the analysis is identical to the one above. The Gale-Shapley hospital 
offering algorithm is characterized by (9) and the initial conditions  (0) D X =∅ and 
(0) H X X = . 
The same logic applies to the Kelso-Crawford model, provided one extends their 
original treatment to include a version in which the workers make offers in addition to the 
treatment in which firms make offers. The words of the preceding paragraphs apply 
exactly, but a contract offer now includes a wage so, for example, a hospital whose 
contract offer is rejected by a doctor may find that its next most preferred contract is at a 
higher wage to the same doctor.   
2. When Contracts are Not Substitutes 
It is clear from the preceding analysis that that definition of substitutes is just 
sufficient to allow our mathematical tools to be applied. In this section, we establish 
more. We show that if there is any hospital for which contracts are not substitutes, the 
very existence of a stable set of contracts cannot be guaranteed.  
Theorem 5. Suppose H contains at least two hospitals, which we denote by h and h′. 
Further suppose that  h R  is not isotone, that is, contracts are not substitutes for h. Then, 
there exist preference orderings for the doctors in set D, a preference ordering for a 
hospital h′ with a single job opening such that, regardless of  the preferences of the other 
hospitals, no stable set of contracts exists.  
Proof. We may limit attention to the case with exactly two hospitals by specifying 
that the doctors find the other hospitals to be unacceptable.  
Suppose h R  is not isotone. Then, there exists some  , x yX ∈  and  X X ′⊂  such that 
for all  , H x Xx h ′ ∈=  and such that  ( ) { } ( ) hh x RX RX y ′′ ∈− ∪ . By construction, since 
{ } () , h x yCX y ′ ∈∪ , contracts x and y specify different doctors, say,  12 DD dx yd ≡≠≡ . 
Let x′ and  y′ denote the corresponding contracts for doctors d1 and d2 in which hospital 
h′ is substituted for h.  
We specify preferences as follows: First, for hospital h′, we take { } { } hh xy ′′ ′′ ∅     
and all other contracts are unacceptable. Second, doctors in 
() { } () () {} 12 , DH H x CX CX y d d ′′ ∪∪ − prefer their elements of 
() { } () HH CX CX y ′′ ∪∪  to any other contract. Third, d1 has { } { }
1 d x x′    and ranks all 
other contracts lower. Fourth, d2 has { } { }
2 d yy ′    and ranks all other contracts lower. 
Finally, the remaining doctors find all contracts from hospitals h and h′ to be 
unacceptable.    13
Consider a feasible, acceptable allocation  X′′ such that  yX ′ ′′ ∈ . Since h′ and d2 can 
have only one contract in  X′′ , , x yX ′ ′′ ∉ . Then, h’s contracts in  X′′ form a subset of 
X′, so x is not included and d1 has a contract less preferred than x′. Then, the deviation 
by () 1, dh ′ to x′ blocks  X′′ .  
Consider a feasible, acceptable allocation  X′′ such that  yX ′ ′′ ∉ . Then, either 
, x yX ′′ ∈  or  X′′  is blocked by a coalition including h, d1 and d2 using the contracts x and 
y. However, if  , x yX ′′ ∈ , then a deviation by ( ) 2, dh ′  to contract  y′ blocks  X′′ .  
Since all feasible allocations are blocked, there exists no stable set of contracts.  ■ 
Together, theorems 3 and 5 characterize the set of preferences that can be allowed as 
inputs into a matching algorithm if we wish to guarantee that the outcome of the 
algorithm is a stable set of contracts with respect to the reported preferences. According 
to theorem 3, we can allow all preferences that satisfy substitutes and still reach an 
outcome that is a stable collection of contracts.  According to theorem 5, if we allow any 
preference that does not satisfy the substitutes condition, then there is some profile of 
singleton preferences for the other parties such that no stable collection of contracts 
exists.  
This theory also reaffirms and extends the close connection between the substitutes 
condition and other concepts that has been established in the recent auctions literature 
with quasi-linear preferences. Milgrom (2000) studies an auction model with discrete 
goods and transfers and in which bidder values are allowed may be any additive function 
and may include other functions as well.
5 He shows that if goods are substitutes, then a 
competitive equilibrium exists. If, however, there are at least three bidders and if there is 
any allowed value such that the goods are not all substitutes, then there is some profile of 
values such that no competitive equilibrium exists. Gul and Stacchetti (1999) establish 
the same positive existence result. They also show that if preferences include all values in 
which a bidder wants only one particular good as well as any one for which goods are not 
all substitutes, and if the number of bidders is sufficiently large, then there is some profile 
of preferences for which no competitive equilibrium exists. Ausubel and Milgrom (2002) 
establish that if (i) there is some bidder for whom preferences are not demand theory 
substitutes, (ii) values may be any additive function and (iii) there are at least three 
bidders in total, then there is some profile of preferences such that the Vickrey outcome is 
not stable and the core imputations do not form a lattice. Conversely, if all bidders have 
preferences that are demand theory substitutes, then the Vickrey outcome is in the core 
and the core imputations do form a lattice. Taken together, these results establish a close 
connection between the substitutes condition, the cooperative concept of the core, the 
non-cooperative concepts of Vickrey outcomes, and competitive equilibrium.  
                                                 
5 A valuation function is additive if the value of any set of items is the sum of the separate values of the 
elements. Such a function v is also described as “modular,” additivity is equivalent to the requirement that 
for all sets A and B,  ( ) ( ) () () vA B vA B vA vB ∪+ ∩= + .    14
3. “Vacancy Chain” Dynamics 
Suppose that a labor market has reached equilibrium, with all interested doctors 
placed at hospitals in a stable match. Suppose some doctor then retires. Imagine a process 
in which a hospital seeks to replace its retired doctor by raiding other hospitals to hire 
additional doctors. If the hospital makes an offer that would succeed in hiring a doctor 
away from another hospital, the affected hospital has three options: it may make an offer 
to another doctor (or several), improve the terms for its current doctor, or leave the 
position vacant. Suppose it makes whatever contract offer would best serve its purposes.  
In models without contracts, this process in which doctors and vacancies move from 
one hospital to another has been called vacancy chain dynamics (Blum, Roth and 
Rothblum (1997)). These analyses exploit both the absence of any adjustments of wages 
or terms of employment and the fact that, in the Gale-Shapley model, the notion of a 
vacancy is well defined by the formulation. Recall that, in that model, a hospital h has nh 
positions. If one of its nh doctors retires, then it has one well-defined vacancy. In our 
more general theory, a hospital might replace a single doctor by multiple others.  
Despite this extra complexity, the formal results for the extended model are quite 
similar to those for an environment with simple responsive preferences. Starting with a 
stable collection of contracts  X′, let  H X′  be the set of contracts that some doctor weakly 
prefers to her current contract in  X′ and let  ( ) DH X XX X ′ ′′ =∪− . As in the proof of 
theorem 1, we have  ( , ) ( , ) D HD H FX X X X ′′ ′′ =  and  D H X XX ′ ′′ = ∩ .  
To study the dynamics that results from the retirement of doctor d, we suppose the 
process starts from the initial state ( (0), (0)) ( , ) D HD H X XX X ′ ′ = . This means that the 
employees start by considering only offers that are at least as good as their current 
positions and that hospitals remember which employees have rejected them in the past. 
The doctors’ rejection function is changed by the retirement of doctor d to  ˆ
D R , where 
ˆ () () { | } DD D R XR X x X x d ′′ ′′ ′′ =∪ ∈ = , that is, in addition to the old rejections, all 
contract offers addressed to the retired doctor are rejected.  
To synchronize the timing with our earlier notation, let us imagine that hospitals 
make offers at round  1 t −  and doctors accept or reject them at round t. Hospitals consider 
as potentially available the doctors in  ˆ (1 ) ( (1 ) ) HD D Xt XRXt − =− − and the doctors then 
reject all but the best offers, so the cumulative set of offers received is 
() ( ( 1 ) ) DH H Xt XRXt =− −. Define:  
  ˆˆ (,) ( () , () ) DH HH DD FX X X R X X R X =− −  (10) 
If contracts are substitutes for the hospitals, then  ˆ F  is isotone and, since 
(,) (,) D HD H FX X X X ′′ ′′ = , it follows that  ˆ(,) (,) D HD H F XX XX ′ ′′ ′ ≥ . Then, since 
(( 0 ) ,( 0 ) ) (,) D HD H X XX X ′′ = , we have: 
  ˆ ( (1), (1)) ( (0), (0)) ( (0), (0)) DH D H D H XX F XX XX =≥ .   15
Iterating,  ˆ ( ( ), ( )) ( ( 1), ( 1)) ( ( 1), ( 1)) DH D H D H X n X n F X nX n X nX n =−− ≥ −− : the doctors 
accumulate offers and the contracts that are potentially available to the hospitals shrinks. 
A fixed point is reached and, by Theorem 1, it corresponds to a stable collection of 
contracts. 
Theorem 6. Suppose that contracts are substitutes and that ( , ) D H X X ′ ′  is a stable set of 
contracts. Suppose that a doctor retires and that the ensuing adjustment process is 
described by ( (0), (0)) ( , ) D HD H X XX X ′ ′ =  and  ˆ ( ( ), ( )) ( ( 1), ( 1)) DH D H XtXt F Xt Xt = −− . 
Then, the sequence { } (( ) ,( ) ) DH X tX t converges to a stable collection of contracts at 
which all the unretired doctors are weakly better off and all the hospitals are weakly 
worse off than at the initial state ( , ) D H X X ′ ′ .
6 
The sequence of contract offers and job moves described by iterated applications of 
ˆ F  includes all the complexity described above. Hospitals that lose a doctor may seek 
several replacements. Hospitals whose doctors receive contract offers may retain those 
doctors by offering better terms or may hire a different doctor and later rehire the original 
doctor at a new contract. All along the way, the doctors find themselves choosing from 
more and better options and the hospitals find themselves marching down their 
preference lists by offering costlier terms, paying higher wages, or making offers to other 
doctors whom they had earlier rejected.  
IV. Law of Aggregate Demand 
We now introduce a second restriction on preferences that allows us to prove the next 
two results about the structure of the core.  We call this restriction the law of aggregate 
demand.  Roughly, this law states that as the price falls, agents should demand more of a 
good.  Here, prices falling corresponds to more contracts being available, and demanding 
more corresponds to taking on (weakly) more contracts.  We formalize this intuition with 
the following definition.  
Definition. The preferences of hospital hH ∈  satisfy the law of aggregate demand if 
for all  X X ′′ ′ ⊂ ,  () () hh CX CX ′′ ′ ≤ .  
According to this definition, if the set of possible contracts expands (analogous to a 
decrease in some doctors’ wages), then the total number of contracts chosen by hospital h 
does not fall. The corresponding property for doctor preferences is implied by revealed 
preference, because each doctor chooses at most one contract. Just as for the substitutes 
condition, when wages are endogenous, we interpret the definition as applying to the 
domain of wage vectors for which the hospital’s optimum is unique.  
Below, the law of aggregate demand allows us to characterize both the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for some of the properties of matching models, allowing us to pin 
down exactly what preference profiles are allowed for both the rural hospitals property to 
hold and to ensure that truthful revelation is a dominant strategy for the doctors.  
                                                 
6 The theorem does not claim, and it is not generally true, that this new point must be the new doctor-best 
stable set of contracts.    16
Previously, in matching models without money, the dominant strategy result was known 
only for responsive preferences with capacity constraints (Abdulkadiroğlu (2003)).  We 
subsume that result with our theorem. 
First, however, we show that the law of aggregate always holds in the Kelso-
Crawford framework of profit-maximizing firms; it is a consequence of the fact that 
firm’s payoff functions are quasilinear.  
Theorem 7. If hospital h’s preferences are quasilinear and satisfy the substitutes 
condition, then they satisfy the law of aggregate demand.  
Proof. Suppose  X DHW =×× and let  () ( ) { } ,| jjj Z wj w w w ≡≥    . Then, the law of 
aggregate demand is the statement that for any wage vectors  ˆ , ww satisfying  ˆ ww ≥  such 
that the choices sets are singletons,  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ˆ CZw CZw ≤ .  
The proof is by contradiction. Suppose the law of aggregate demand does not hold. 
Then there exists a wage vector w and a doctor d such that for some (and hence all) 
0 ε > ,  () () ( ) () ,, dd dd CZw w CZw w εε −− +> −. Since h’s preferences are quasi-linear, 
changing doctor d’s wage can affect the hiring of other doctors only if it affects the hiring 
of doctor d.  It follows that there are exactly two optimal choices for the hospital at wage 
vector w; these are  () () , dd CZw w ε − −  at which doctor d is hired and  () () , dd CZw w ε − +  
at which d is not hired but such that two other doctors are hired, that is, there exist 
doctors  () () ( ) ( ) ,, , dd dd dd CZw w CZw w εε −− ′′ ′ ∈+ −− . Let the corresponding payoff 
for the hospital (when faced with wage vector w) be π.  
Consider the wage vector  {} , (, 2 ,) dd dd ww w w ε ε ′ ′ − ′ = −− . For ε positive and 
sufficiently small, the hospital’s payoff at wage vector w′ is  2 π ε +  if it chooses 
() () , dd CZw w ε − +  and it is π ε +  if it chooses  ( ) ( ) , dd CZw w ε − − , and one of these 
choices must be optimal. So,  ( ) ( ) () , dd Cw CZw w ε − ′ =+ . But then, raising the wage of 
doctor d′ from  2 d w ε ′ −  to  d w ′ while holding the other wages at  d w ′ − ′  reduces the demand 
for doctor d″ from one to zero, in violation of the demand theory substitutes condition.     
 
1. Rural Hospitals Theorem 
In the match between doctors and hospitals, certain rural hospitals often had trouble 
filling all their positions, raising the question of whether there are other core matches at 
which the rural hospitals might do better. Roth (1986) analyzed this question for the case 
of  X DH =× and responsive preferences and found that the answer is no: every hospital 
that has unfilled positions at some stable match is assigned exactly the same doctors at 
every stable match. In particular, every hospital hires the same number of doctors at 
every stable match.    17
In this section, we show by an example that this last conclusion does not generalize to 
the full set of environments in which contracts are substitutes.
7 We then prove that if 
preferences satisfy the law of aggregate demand and substitutes, then the last conclusion 
of Roth’s theorem holds: every hospital signs exactly the same number of contracts at 
every point in the core, although the doctors assigned and the terms of employment can 
vary. Finally, we show that any violation of the law of aggregate demand implies 
preferences exist such that the above conclusion does not hold. 
Suppose that  { } 12 , Hh h =  and  { } 123 ,, Dd d d = . For hospital h1, suppose its choices 
maximize  , where:  
  { } { } { } { } { } { } 31 212 1 32 3 ,, , dd ddd d dd d ∅          .   (11) 
This preference satisfies substitutes.
8 Suppose h2 has one position, with its preferences 
among doctors given by  123 ddd∅    . Finally, suppose d1 and d2 prefer h1 to h2 
while d3 has the reverse preference. Then, the matches  ( ) ( ) { } 13 21 ,,, X hd hd ′ =  and 
() () () { } 11 12 23 ,, ,,, X hd hd hd ′′ =  are both stable but hospital h1 employs a different 
number of doctors and the set of doctors assigned differs between the two matches.  
This example involves a failure of the law of aggregate demand, because as the set of 
available contracts expands by the addition of d3 to the set { } 12 , dd , the number of 
doctors demanded declines from two to one. When the law of aggregate demand holds, 
however, we have the following result.  
Theorem 8. If hospital preferences satisfy substitutes and the law of aggregate 
demand, then for every stable allocation ( ) , DH X X  and every dD ∈  and hH ∈ , 
() () dD dD CX CX =  and  () () hH hH CX CX = . That is, every doctor and hospital signs 
the same number of contracts at every stable collection of contracts.  
Proof. By definition,  D D X X ⊂ , so by revealed preference,  ( ) () dD dD CX CX ≥ . 
Also,  H H X X ⊂ , so by the law of aggregate demand,  ( ) () hH hH CX CX ≤ . By Theorem 
1,  () () D DH H CX CX =  and  () ( ) D DH H CX CX = , so  ( ) () dD hH dD hH CX CX
∈∈ = ∑ ∑  
and  () () dD hH dD hH CX CX
∈∈ = ∑∑ . Combining these leads to  () dD dDCX
∈ ≥ ∑  
() () ( ) ( ) dD hH hH dD dD hH hH dD CX CX CX CX
∈∈∈∈ =≥= ∑∑∑∑ , which begins and 
ends with the same sum. Hence, none of the inequalities can be strict.  ■  
The next theorem verifies that the counterexamples developed above can always be 
generalized whenever any hospital’s preferences violate the law of aggregate demand. 
                                                 
7 A similar example appears in Martínez, Massó, Neme and Oviedo (2000).  
8 These preferences, however, do not display the “single improvement property” that Gul and Stacchetti 
(1999) introduce and show is characteristic of substitutes preferences in models with quasi-linear utility.    18
 Theorem 9. If there exists a hospital h and sets  X XX ′ ′′ ⊂⊂ such that 
() () hh CX CX ′′ ′ >  and at least one other hospital, then there exist singleton preferences 
for the other hospitals and doctors such that the number of doctors employed by h is 
different for two stable matches.  
Proof. Since  () () hh CX CX ′′ ′ > , there exists some set Y,  X YX ′ ′′ ⊂⊂  and contract 
x  such that  () { } () hh CY CY x >∪ .  Since  { } ( ) h x CY x ∈∪ (as otherwise 
() { } () hh CY CY x =∪  for the preferences to be rationalizable) there must exist two 
contracts  { } () ( ) , hh yz R Y x R Y ∈∪ − , such that  yxzy ≠ ≠≠.  Moreover, since 
() , h yz C Y ∈ ,  D D yz ≠ .  
Denoting by h′ the second hospital whose existence is hypothesized by the theorem, 
we specify preferences as follows.  Let all the doctors with contracts in Y have those 
contracts be their most favored, and let all other doctors find any contract with h 
unacceptable. Let all doctors find any contract not involving hospital h or h′ to be 
unacceptable.  
In principle, there are three cases.  
If  D D x y = , then let  :
D x Pyx    and  :
D z Pz . Then, there exist two stable matches, 
{ } () h CY x ∪  and  () h CY, with  D z  employed in the first match but not in the second.   
The case  D D x z =  is symmetric.  
Finally, if  D DD yxz ≠≠, then let  ,, x yz ′ ′′  denote contracts with hospital h′ where the 
doctors (and any other terms) are the same as in  ,, x yz  respectively.  Specify the 
remaining preferences by 
D x Px x ′ =   , 
D y Py y ′ =   , 
D z Pz z ′ =   , and 
{ } { } ' '' { } h Py x z ′ =∅      . Then, there exist two different stable matches, 
{ } () h x CY ′ ∪ and  { } { } () h yC Yx ′ ∪∪ , with  D z  employed in the first match but not in the 
second.  ■   
This shows that the law of aggregate demand is not only a sufficient condition 
but, in the sense described by the theorem, a necessary one to guarantee that each agent 
has the same number of contracts at every stable match.  
2. Truthful Revelation as a Dominant Strategy  
The main result of this section concerns doctors’ incentives to report their preferences 
truthfully. For the doctor-offering algorithm, if hospital preferences satisfy the law of 
aggregate demand and the substitutes condition, then it is dominant strategy for doctors to   19
truthfully reveal their preferences over contracts.
9  We then further show that both 
preference conditions play essential roles in the conclusion.  
We will show the positive incentive result for the doctor offering algorithm in two 
steps that highlight the different roles of the two preference assumptions.  First, we show 
that the substitutes condition, by itself, guarantees that doctors will not want to 
exaggerate the ranking of an unattainable contract. More precisely, if there exists a 
preferences list for a doctor d such that d obtains contract x by submitting this list, then d 
can also obtain x by submitting a preference list that includes only contract x.  Second, we 
will show that adding the law of aggregate demand guarantees that a doctor does at least 
as well as reporting truthfully as by reporting any singleton. Together, these are the 
dominant strategy result.  
To understand why submitting unattained contracts can not help a doctor d, consider 
the following.  Let x be the most-preferred contract that d can obtain by submitting any 
preference list (holding all other submitted preferences fixed).  Note that all that d 
accomplishes when reporting that certain contracts are preferred to x is to make it easier 
for some coalition to block outcomes involving x. Thus, if x is attainable with any report, 
it is attainable with the report  : d Px  that ranks x as the only acceptable contract. This 
intuition is captured in the following theorem: 
Theorem 10. Let hospitals’ preferences satisfy the substitutes condition and let the 
matching algorithm produce the doctor-optimal match. Fixing the preferences of 
hospitals and of doctors besides d, let x be the outcome that d obtains by reporting 
preferences  12 : ... dd d d n d Pz z z x       . Then, the outcome that d obtains by reporting 
preferences : d Px ′  is also x. 
Proof..  Let X′denote the collection of contracts chosen by the algorithm when doctor 
d submits preference  d P .  If this collection, which is stable under the reported 
preferences, is not stable under  d P′, then there exists a blocking coalition. This blocking 
coalition must contain d, as no other doctor’s preferences have changed, but that is 
impossible, since x is d’s favorite contract according to the preferences  d P′.  Since  X′ is 
stable under  d P′, the doctor-optimal stable match under  d P′ (the existence of which is 
guaranteed by Theorem 2) must make every doctor (weakly) better off than at  X′. In 
particular, doctor d must obtain x.  ■  
Some other doctors may be strictly better off when d submits her shorter preference 
list;  there are fewer collections of contracts that d now objects to, so the core may 
become larger, and the doctor-optimal point of the enlarged core makes all doctors 
weakly better off and may make some strictly better off.  
Without the law of aggregate demand, however, it may still be in a doctor’s interest to 
conceal her preferences for unattainable positions. To see this, consider the case with two 
                                                 
9 It is, of course, not a dominant strategy for hospitals to truthfully reveal; nor would it be so even if we 
considered the hospital offering algorithm. For further discussion of this point, see Roth and Sotomayor 
(1990).    20
hospitals and three doctors, where contracts are simply elements of DH × , and let 
preferences be: 
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With these preferences, the only stable match is  ( ) ( ) { } 12 31 ,,, dh dh , which leaves  2 d  
unemployed.  However, if  2 d  were to reverse her ranking of the two hospitals, then 
() () () { } 11 21 32 ,,,,, dh dh dh  would be chosen by the doctor-offering algorithm, leaving  2 d  
better off.  Essentially, by offering a contract to  2 h ,  2 d  has changed the number of 
positions available.  However, when the preferences of the hospitals satisfy the law of 
aggregate demand, making more offers to the hospitals cannot reduce the number of 
contracts the hospitals accept.  
Theorem 11. Let hospitals' preferences satisfy substitutes and the law of aggregate 
demand and let the matching algorithm produce the doctor-optimal match. Then, fixing 
the preferences of the other doctors and of all the hospitals, let x be the contract that d 
obtains by submitting the set of preferences  12 : ... dd d d n d Pz z z x       . Then the 
preferences  12 1 : ... ... dn n N Py y y x y y + ′′             obtain a contract that is  d P′′ -
preferred or indifferent to x.  
Proof..  From Theorem 10,  : d Px ′  also obtains x.  Hence, by the rural hospitals 
theorem, d is employed at every point in the core when  : d Px ′  is submitted. So, every 
allocation  X′ at which d is unemployed is blocked by some coalition and set of contracts 
when d submits  d P′. Consequently, if d submits the preferences 
*
12 : ... dn Py y y x       , 
then every allocation at which d is unemployed is still blocked, by the same coalition and 
set of contracts. Since the doctor-best stable allocation is one at which d gets a 
*
d P -
acceptable contract, that allocation is weakly 
*
d P -preferred to x. Finally, the doctor-
optimal match when 
*
d P  is submitted is still the doctor-optimal match when  d P′′  is 
submitted, as d’s preferences over contracts less preferred than x cannot be used to block 
a match where she receives a contract weakly preferred to x.  ■ 
According to this theorem, when a doctor’s true preferences are  d P′′, the doctor can 
never do better according to these true preferences than by reporting the preferences 
truthfully.  
In fact, the law of aggregate demand is “almost” a necessary condition as well.  The 
exceptions can arise because certain violations of the law of aggregate demand are 
unobservable from the choice data of the algorithm, and these cannot affect incentives. 
Thus, consider an example where terms t are included in the contract, and where a 
hospital h has preferences:   21
  () { } () ( ) { } ( ) { } ( ) { } 11 11 22 11 22 ,, ,, , ,, ,, ,, dh t dh t dh t dh t dh t         . 
Although these preferences violate the law of aggregate demand, the algorithm will never 
“see” the violation, as either () ( )
1 11 11 ,, ,, d dh t dh t     or ( ) ( )
1 11 11 ,, ,, d dh t dh t     .  Thus, 
whichever terms that  1 d  first offers will determine a conditional set of preferences for the 
hospital that do satisfy the law of aggregate demand. (The hospital will never reject an 
offer of either () 11 ,, dh t or () 11 ,, dh t   .)   
The next theorem says that if some hospital’s preferences violate the law of aggregate 
demand in a way that can even potentially be observed from the hospital’s choices, then 
there exist preferences for the other agents such that it is not a dominant strategy for 
doctors to report truthfully, even when the other assumptions we have used are satisfied.  
Theorem 12. Let hospital h have preferences such that  ( ) { } () hh CX CX x >∪  and 
let there exist two contracts y, z such that  D DDD yzxy ≠ ≠≠ and 
{ } () () , hh yz R X x R X ∈∪ − .  Then if another hospital h′ exists, there exist singleton 
preferences for the hospitals besides h and preferences for the doctors such that it is not a 
dominant strategy for all doctors to reveal their preferences truthfully. 
Proof. Consider contracts x′, y′ and z′ such that  D D x x′ = ,  D D yy ′ = ,  D D zz ′ =  and 
HHH x yzh ′′′′ === . Let the preferences of the three identified be  :
D x Pxx ′   , :
D y Pyy ′   , 
and  :
D z Pzz ′   , and let those of h′ be  :{ } { } { } h Py z x ′ ′ ′′   . For the other contracts 
() ˆ h x YCX ∈≡ , let  ˆ x be  ˆD x ’s most favored contract. For the remaining doctors, let any 
contract with h or h′ be unacceptable.  
With the preceding preferences, the only stable allocation includes contracts x and y′, 
leaving doctor  D z  unemployed.  If, however,  D z  misrepresents her preferences and 
reports  :
D z Pzz ′′   , then the doctor-optimal stable match includes z, leaving doctor  D z  
better off.  ■ 
Thus, to the extent that the law of aggregate demand for hospital preferences has 
observable consequences for the progress of the doctor-offering algorithm, it is an 
indispensable condition for the algorithm to have the dominant strategy property for 
doctors.  
V. Classes of Conforming Preferences 
One of the most important issues in practical applications of matching theory is to 
provide ways for the participants to report their preferences to the mechanism. In the 
National Resident Matching Program, the doctors specify preferences by a rank order list 
of acceptable hospitals. Hospital preferences, however, are not as simple as a rank order 
list of acceptable doctors and a number of openings to be filled. To accommodate 
practical concerns, hospitals are also permitted to specify certain affirmative action 
constraints and to indicate that if positions in, say, a subspecialty of internal medicine   22
cannot be filled, then those positions revert to the internal medicine program to be filled 
there.   
If wages or wages and other terms were added to the Match, would it be practically 
possible to specify a reporting interface that doctors and hospitals could use? For doctors, 
one possible approach would presume that each doctor has quasi-linear preferences and 
ask doctors to specify the lowest acceptable wage for each position. For hospitals, matters 
are more complicated, and not only because of the affirmative action and subspecialty 
considerations described above. For example, we might also allow the wage a hospital is 
willing to offer to depend on how many doctors it could attract.  
How can such preferences be parameterized conveniently? Would the resulting 
preferences make doctors’ contracts substitutes? Would hospital preferences satisfy the 
law of aggregate demand? Our approach to this problem builds on the class of assignment 
value preferences introduced by Shapley (1962) in a different context.  
The assignment value preferences can be described as follows. Let doctors be indexed 
by dD ∈  and the types of jobs that doctors do be indexed by  j J ∈ , with the 
understanding that each doctor fills just one job. There are  j m  jobs of type j. The 
productivity of doctor d in job type j is  dj α . The value of a collection of doctors is their 
total productivity when they are assigned optimally across jobs. Letting  1 dj z =  denote the 
decision to assign doctor d to job type j, the value of a set of doctors SD ⊂  to hospital h 
is:  
 
ˆ ( ) max  subject to 
 for 
1 for 
0 for 
{0,1} for all  ,
hd j d j dS z
dj j dS
dj jJ
dj
vS z
zm j J
dS
z
dS
zd j
α
∈
∈
∈
=
≤∈
∈ ⎧
≤ ⎨ ∉ ⎩
∈
∑
∑
∑
 (12) 
A valuations  ˆh v  is called an assignment valuation on D if there exists a triple 
( ) , ,( ) ,[ ] jj J d jj J d D Jm α ∈∈ ∈  such that  ˆh v  has the form (12).  
For a basic matching problem with transfers, let  X DHW = ××. If the wage vector is 
w,  then profit-maximizing hospital h chooses a set of doctors S to maximize its net 
profit:  ˆ () hd dS vS w
∈ −∑ . We say that  ˆh v  is a substitutes valuation if the choices it implies 
satisfy the demand theory substitutes condition. Shapley (1962) established that 
valuations of the form (12) are substitutes valuations.  
Intuitively, the valuation (12) can be understood as the value to a market consisting of 
several hospitals of a set of doctors S. Each hospital is this interpretation is indexed by j 
and hospital j has mj positions to fill. The coefficient  ij α  is the value of doctor i to 
hospital j. The market assigns doctors to hospitals efficiently, so it maximizes the 
hospitals’ total value, as described by (12). It is obvious in this specification that the   23
doctors are substitutes for each hospital, so the corresponding market demand function 
derived from (12) also displays the substitutes property.    
A limitation of the family of assignment valuations is that it is not closed under 
conditioning. That is, if the hospital has a set of jobs J and already has in its employ 
people who can fill some of the jobs, then its value for additional doctors is not 
necessarily an assignment valuation. It will prove helpful to extend the assignment 
valuations to a family that is closed under conditioning, as follows.  
Given sets of doctors D and jobs J, we introduce a fictitious set of additional doctors 
ˆ D, where  ˆ DD ∩= ∅  and a matrix of productivities [ ] dj α  indexed on  ˆ () DDJ ∪× . Let 
ˆh v  be defined by (12) on this larger set. For SD ⊂ , the incremental assignment 
valuation on D parameterized by  ˆ,
ˆ (,, ( ) , [ ] ) jj J d j dDDjJ DJ m α ∈ ∈∪ ∈  is defined by: 
  ˆˆ ˆˆ () ( ) () hh h vS vD S vD =∪ − . (13) 
By taking  ˆ D =∅, the incremental assignment valuations encompass the assignment 
valuations, and this class is obviously closed under conditioning as described above. To 
show that the incremental assignment valuations are substitutes valuations, we use the 
following theorem.  
Theorem 13. For any substitutes valuation  ˆh v , the function  h v  defined by (13) is a 
substitutes valuation. In particular, every incremental assignment valuation is a 
substitutes valuation.  
Proof. A valuation v is a substitutes valuation if and only if the corresponding indirect 
profit function ( ( ) ( ) d dS p vS p π
∈ =− ∑ ) is submodular (see Ausubel and Milgrom 
(2002)). If  ˆ π  is the indirect profit function corresponding to  ˆh v , then the indirect profit 
function corresponding to  h v  is  11 ˆ ˆˆ ( ,..., ) ( ,..., ,0,...,0) ( ) NN h p pp p v D ππ =− . Since  ˆ π  the 
profit function of the substitutes valuation  ˆh v , it is submodular, and hence π is 
submodular as well.  ■ 
By Theorem 7, since the choices based on the incremental assignment valuations are 
profit-maximizing choices from a substitutes valuation, they satisfy the law of aggregate 
demand. Thus, all of the preceding theorems in this paper apply to preferences of this 
form.  
Let us now show how the preferences based on incremental assignment valuations 
can be used to nest and extend the certain other preferences that have been suggested for 
use in matching theory algorithms with or without transfers.  
The most commonly studied class of preferences for matching problems without 
transfers are the responsive preferences, according to which each hospital h has a fixed 
number of openings  h n , a set of acceptable doctors 
A
h DD ⊂ , and a strict ordering  h    of 
the acceptable doctors. When a doctor is unacceptable, that means that hiring the doctor 
is always worse than leaving her position unfilled. Given any set of available doctors, the   24
hospital hires its  h n  most preferred acceptable doctors, if that many are available, and 
otherwise hires all of the acceptable doctors. 
To map responsive preferences into the assignment problem framework, define a 
utility function  : h uD →    with three properties: (1) on the restricted domain 
A
h D ,  h u  
represents  h   ,  (2)  () 0
A
hh dD u d ∈⇒ > , and (3)  () 0
A
hh dD u d ∉ ⇒< . We specify an 
assignment problem as follows:  {1} J = ,  1 h mn = , and  1 ()1 dh ud α = + . Finally, we 
represent the matching problem without transfers as a matching problem with transfers 
with a fixed wage of 1:  {1} W = . Using a positive wage is a device to ensure that the 
hospital strictly prefers not to hire a doctor that it plans not to assign to any job.  
With this specification, given any collection of doctors DD ′⊂ , the assignment 
problem preferences chose the set of doctors/contracts that solves max ( ) SD h xS ud ′ ⊂ ∈ ∑  
subject to  h Sn ≤ . At the solution to this problem, the hospital never chooses any 
unacceptable doctor d, because the objective is always increased by eliminating her 
(since ( ) 0 h ud< ). Also, if there are at most  h n  acceptable doctors in D′, then the 
hospital chooses all of them (since each adds a positive amount to the objective function). 
Finally, if there are more than  h n  acceptable doctors, by inspection, the hospital chooses 
the  h n  most preferred doctors from D′. That precisely describes the responsive 
preferences specification, so responsive preferences are a special case of assignment 
value preferences.  
Among the extensions of responsive preferences that have been important in practice 
are ones to accommodate affirmative action objectives. One kind of affirmative action 
policy reserves jobs for members of certain target groups. To accomplish that, for each 
affirmative action group j, define a corresponding job type j. Specify that any doctor d 
that is a member of group j has  () dj h ud α =  and any doctor not in group j has  0 dj α = . 
One may also introduce an unrestricted category of jobs j′ that any doctor can fill with 
productivity ( ) dj h ud α ′ = . This structure ensures that for any  j j′ ≠ , only members of 
group j will be selected to fill jobs of type j.  
A less extreme version of affirmative action would allow positions to be filled by 
non-minority candidates if no qualified minorities are available. To accomplish that, one 
can use productivity “bonuses,” specifying that acceptable doctors d in group j have 
productivity ( ) dj h j ud b α =+  in jobs of category j and productivity  ( ) dj h ud α =  in all 
other jobs. If the productivity bonus  j b  is very large, then the hospital will always prefer 
an acceptable group member to fill the corresponding job, but may fill the job with 
someone else when no candidate from group j is available.  
Unlike other specifications used in the matching literature, ours permits overlapping 
affirmative action categories, provided that each person is counted toward filling only 
one kind of quota. For example, suppose that a small hospital has a target of hiring one 
female and one member of a certain minority. If the hospital does not permit double 
counting, then if it hires a female minority doctor, it can meet the constraint either by   25
hiring another female doctor or another minority doctor. Such preferences can be 
modeled in our framework by reserving jobs for females and minorities in the fashion 
described above and allowing that a female minority candidate can be productive in both 
female- and minority-reserved jobs.  
A recent treatment of affirmative action by Roth (1991), extended by Abdulkadiroğlu 
(2003), uses the class of responsive preferences with capacity constraints. This class 
requires that the set of doctors be partitioned into a finite number of groups { } j D  and that 
the hospital have capacities  j m  that impose an upper bound on the number of doctors 
that can be hired from each group  j D . This model has limited flexibility. For example, 
when there are more than two groups, it cannot represent preferences that call for a 
minimum number of doctors to be hired from each group.  
Responsive preferences with capacity constraints cannot be represented by an 
assignment valuation if  jh jJmn
∈ > ∑ , but they can be represented by incremental 
assignment valuations, as follows. Identify job types with categories of doctors, 
introducing  j m  jobs of type j, so that the total number of jobs is  j jJm
∈ ∑ . Specify a 
wage of 1 and set  ( ) 1 dj h ud α =+  for any doctor d in group j and  0 dj α =  otherwise. 
Introduce a set  ˆ D with  jh jJmn
∈ − ∑  identically productive doctors. For any  ˆ dD ∈  and 
j J ∈ , set  jd M α = , where M is a large number. The large M ensures that all of the 
doctors in  ˆ D will be assigned jobs at any optimal solution to (12), so only  h n  jobs are 
effectively available to be filled by doctors in D. This specification ensures that both the 
capacity constraints and the overall limit on the number of doctors to be hired will be 
respected by the solution to the problem.  
For any incremental assignment valuation, since the wage is 1, the hospital chooses 
the set S of doctors that maximizes  () h vS S − . By inspection, this problem is equivalent 
to choosing S to maximize  ( ) h dS ud
∈ ∑  subject to  jj SD m ∩ ≤  and  h Sn ≤ . The 
specification thus represents responsive preferences with capacity constraints.  
The extended assignment valuations can also be used to represent positions that revert 
to subspecialties. Such “reversion” preferences are logically equivalent to imposing a 
capacity constraint on each subspecialty along with the overall constraint on the whole 
internal medicine program.  
Extended assignment valuations thus provide a flexible, parameterized way for 
hospitals to represent their preferences for matching with or without wages using a class 
of quasi-linear preferences that satisfies the substitutes condition and the law of aggregate 
demand.  
VI. Cumulative Offer Processes and Auctions 
The algorithms described by the system (9) with different starting points have the 
property that they can terminate only at a stable set of contracts. Nevertheless, unless 
preferences satisfy the substitutes condition, the system is not guaranteed to converge at   26
all, even when a fixed point exists. In this section, we offer a different characterization of 
the Gale-Shapley doctor-offering algorithm that will prove especially well suited to 
situations in which contracts may not be substitutes, but in which there is just one 
“hospital”—the auctioneer. For now, we allow the possibility that there are several 
hospitals.  
The alternative representation is constructed by replacing the system of equations (9) 
by the following system: 
  ( )
()
() ( 1 )
() ( 1 ) ()
DH H
HH D D
Xt XRXt
X tX t C X t
=− −
=− ∪
 (14) 
We call the algorithm that begins with  (0) D X X =  and  (0) H X = ∅ and obeys (14) a 
cumulative offer process, because the formalism captures the idea that hospitals 
accumulate offers from doctors in the set  ( ) H X t  and hold their best choices  () () HH CXt  
from the accumulated set. There is no assumption of consistency imposed on the 
algorithm, so it is possible that several hospitals are “holding” contract offers from the 
same doctor. The corresponding allocation is, of course, infeasible, since each doctor can 
ultimately accept just one contract.  
At each round t of the cumulative offer process, all doctors make their best offers 
from the set of not-yet-rejected choices  ( ) D X t , but any doctor d for whom a contract is 
being held simply repeats one of its earlier offers. Thus, new offers are made only by 
doctors who have been rejected.  
To see why this is so, let  ( ) () HH x CXt ∈  be a contract that is being held and consider 
the corresponding doctor  D x d = . By revealed preference, doctor d strictly prefers x to 
any contract that she has not yet offered, since those contracts were available to offer at 
the time that x was offered. Since d’s most preferred contract in  ( ) d X t  at the current time 
must be weakly preferred to x, it must be coincide with one of d’s earlier offers.   
The second equation of system (14) is the one that distinguishes the cumulative offer 
process from the system in (9). In the cumulative offer process, without any assumptions 
about hospitals’ preferences,  ( ) H X t  grows monotonically from round to round, so the 
sequence of sets converges. In contrast, the earlier process was only guaranteed to 
converge when contracts are substitutes for the hospitals.  
When contracts are substitutes, the two systems of equations are equivalent. 
Theorem 14.  Suppose that contracts are substitutes for the hospitals and that 
(0) D X X =  and  (0) H X =∅. Then, the sequences of pairs {( ( ), ( ))} DH X tX t  generated by 
the two laws of motion (9) and (14) are identical.  
Proof. Suppose that contracts are substitutes for the hospitals. We proceed by 
induction. The initial condition specifies that the sequences are identical through time 
0 t = .  Denote the sequence corresponding to the cumulative offer process by a 
superscript C and denote the alternative process defined by (9) with no superscript. 
Assume the inductive hypothesis that the sequences are the same up to round  1 t −  and   27
suppress the corresponding superscripts for the values at that round. Then, 
() ( ( 1 ) ) ()
C
DH HD X tX R X t X t =− −= .  This also implies that  
 (1 ) ( ) HD X Xt Xt = −∪ .   (15) 
To complete the proof, we must show that  () ()
C
HH X tX t =  or, equivalently, that 
(1 ) ( ( ) ) ( ( ) ) HD D D D X t CXt XRXt −∪ = − .  
For  2 t ≥ , ( 2) ( 1)
CC
HH Xt Xt −⊂ −  by construction, so by the inductive hypothesis 
(2 ) (1 ) HH Xt Xt −⊂ − . Since contracts are substitutes,  H R  is isotone, so 
(( 1 ) ) HH XRXt −− ⊂  ((2 ) ) HH XRXt −−  and hence  ( ) ( 1) DD Xt Xt ⊂− . For  1 t = , the 
inclusion ( ) ( 1) DD Xt Xt ⊂−  is implied by the initial condition  (0) D X X = .  
Recall that, by revealed preference,  D R  is isotone. It follows that 
()( ) () ( 1 ) DD DD RXt RXt ⊂−  and hence, using (9), that  () (1 ) (1 ) HD D Xt XRXt − =− −⊂  
() () () DD H X RXt Xt −= .  Thus,  ( ) ( ) (1 ) (1 ) ( ) HH D D Xt Xt XRXt − =− ∩ − =  
() (1 ) ( ) HD D X tR X t −− . So,  ( 1) ( ( )) HD D X tC X t − ∪=   ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( ( ) ) HD D D Xt Xt RXt − ∪− =  
() ( ) ( 1 )( ( ) ) ( )( ( ) ) HD D D D D Xt RXt Xt RXt −− ∪ − =  ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( ( ) ) HD D D X tX t R X t − ∪− =  
(( ) ) DD X RXt − , where the last step equality follows from (15).     
Even with the initial condition  (0) D X X =  and  (0) H X = ∅, the algorithms described 
by (9) and (14) may differ when contracts are not substitutes. In that case, by inspection 
of the system (14), the cumulative offer process still converges, because  ( ) H X t  is 
bounded by the finite set X and grows monotonically from round to round. What is at 
issue is whether the hospital’s choice from its final search set in the cumulative offer 
process is a feasible and stable set of contracts.  
We will find below that when there is a single hospital, the outcome is indeed a 
feasible and stable set of contracts. In that case, the cumulative offer process coincides 
with the generalized proxy auction of Ausubel and Milgrom (2002). Those authors 
analyze in detail the case when a bid consists of a price and a subset of the set of goods 
that the bidder wishes to buy. At each round, the seller “holds” the collection of bids that 
maximizes its total revenues subject to the constraint that each good can be sold only 
once. The generalized proxy auction, however, is not limited to the sale of goods and, in 
fact, is identical in scope to our present model of matching with contracts. In particular, 
the auctioneer may impose a variety of constraints on the feasible collections of bids and 
may weigh non-price factors either exclusively or in combination with prices to decide 
which collection of bids to hold. Bidders, for their parts, may make bids that include 
factors besides price, and may not include price at all.  
To illustrate the role of general contracts in this auction setting, consider the auction 
design suggested by Brewer and Plott (1996), in which bidders seek to buy access to a 
railroad track. In that application, a bid specifies a train’s direction of travel and departure 
and arrival times, as well as the price offered. It is assumed that trains travel at a uniform 
speed along the track. In this setting, the contract terms must include the direction and the   28
two times and the seller is constrained to hold only combinations of bids such that trains 
maintain safe distances from one another at all times.  
A second example of the generalized proxy process is a procurement auction in which 
the buyer scores suppliers on the basis of such factors as quality, excess capacity, credit 
rating, and historical reliability, as well as price, and in which the buyer prefers to set 
aside some amount of its purchase for minority contractors or to maintain geographic 
diversity of supply to reduce the chance of supply disruptions. In an asset sale, the seller 
may weigh the probability that the sale will be completed, for example due to financing 
contingencies or because a union or anti-trust regulators must approve the sale.  
The cumulative offer process model with general contracts accommodates all of these 
possibilities. The auctioneer in the model corresponds to a single “hospital”—hereafter 
the auctioneer—with a choice function,  H C , that selects her most preferred collection of 
contract proposals. We have the following result (which is first stated using different 
notation than in the Ausubel-Milgrom paper):  
Theorem 15. When the doctor-offering cumulative offer process with a single hospital 
terminates at time t with outcome ( ( ), ( )) DH X tX t, the hospital’s choice  ( ( )) HH CXt is a 
stable collection of contracts.  
Proof. By construction, any contract not in  ( ) H X t  is less preferred by some doctor d 
than every corresponding contract in  ( ) H X t  (because doctor d offers her most preferred 
contracts in sequence). So, any collection of contracts that includes some not in  ( ) H X t  
must be strictly less preferred by one of the doctors. Any profitable coalitional deviation 
must use only contracts in  ( ) H X t .  
By construction, the one hospital/auctioneer must be part of any deviating coalition, 
and ( ( )) HH CXt is its strictly most preferred collection of contracts in  ( ) H X t , so there is 
no profitable coalitional deviation using just contracts in  ( ) H X t .  ■ 
Cumulative offer processes connect the theory of matching with contracts to the 
emerging theory of package auctions and auctions with complex constraints.  
VII. Conclusion 
We have introduced a general model of matching with bilateral contracts that 
encompasses and extends two-sided matching models with and without money and 
certain auction models. The new formulation allows some contract terms to be 
exogenously fixed and others to be endogenous, in any combinations. In this very general 
framework, we characterize stable collections of contracts in terms of the solution to a 
certain system of equations.  
The key to the analysis is to extend two concepts of demand theory to models with or 
without prices. The first concept to be extended is the notion of substitutes. Our definition 
essentially applies the Roth-Sotomayor substitutable preferences condition to a more 
general class of contracts: contracts are substitutes if, whenever the set of feasible 
bilateral contracts expands, the set of contracts that the firm rejects also expands. We 
show that (1) our definition coincides with the usual demand theory condition when both   29
apply, (2) when contracts are substitutes, a stable collection of contracts exists, (3) if any 
hospital or firm has preferences that are not substitutes, then there are preferences with 
single openings for each other firm such that no stable allocation exists. We further show 
that when the substitute condition applies, (4) both the doctor-offering and hospital-
offering Gale-Shapley algorithms can be represented as iterated operations of the same 
operator (starting from different initial conditions) and (5) starting at a stable allocation 
from which a doctor retires, a natural market dynamic mimics the Gale-Shapley process 
to find a new stable allocation.  
The second relevant demand theory concept is the law of demand, which we extend 
both to include heterogeneous inputs and to encompass models with or without prices. 
The law of aggregate demand condition holds that when the set of feasible contracts 
expands, the number of contracts that the firm chooses to sign weakly increases. In terms 
of traditional demand theory, this means that, for example, when the wages of some of a 
heterogeneous group of workers falls, if the workers are substitutes, then the total number 
of workers employed rises. We show that (1) when inputs are substitutes, the choices of a 
profit-maximizing firm/hospital satisfy the law of aggregate demand. Moreover, when the 
choices of every hospital/firm satisfies the law of aggregate demand and the substitutes 
condition, then (2)  the set of workers/doctors employed is the same at every stable 
allocation, (3) the number employed by each firm/hospital is also the same, and 
(4) truthful reporting is a dominant strategy for doctors in the doctor-offering algorithm. 
Moreover, we prove (5) that if the law of aggregate demand fails in any potentially 
observable way, then the preceding dominant strategy property does not hold.  
For these results to be useful for practical mechanism design, one needs to account 
for how preferences, especially hospital preferences, are to be reported to the mechanism. 
There needs to be a convenient way for hospitals to express a rich array of preferences, 
and one needs to know whether the preferences being reported actually satisfy the 
conditions of the various theorems. Toward that end, we introduce a parametric form that 
we call extended assignment valuations that strictly generalize several existing 
specifications and that always satisfy both the substitutes and law of aggregate demand 
conditions.  
Finally, we introduce an alternative treatment of the doctor-offering algorithm—the 
cumulative offer process. We show that when contracts are substitutes, the previously 
characterized doctor-offering algorithm coincides exactly with a cumulative offer 
process. When contracts are not substitutes but there is just one hospital (the 
“auctioneer”), the cumulative offer process coincides with the Ausubel-Milgrom 
ascending proxy auction. This identity clarifies the connection between these algorithms 
and, combined with the dominant strategy theorem reported above, generalizes the 
Ausubel-Milgrom dominant strategy theorem for the proxy auctions.  
Our new approach reveals deep similarities among several of the most successful 
auction and matching designs in current use and among the environmental conditions in 
which, theoretically, the mechanisms should perform at their best. Understanding these 
similarities can help us to understand the limitations of these mechanisms, paving the 
way for new designs.  
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